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Equity analysts’ target price estimates are uncertain. Some analysts gauge this uncertainty by 
supplementing their target prices with a risk assessment in the form of a bull–bear analysis 
(BBA). We explore whether disclosing a BBA reduces analysts’ target price error or, 
alternatively, whether analysts disclose a BBA to make their forecasts seem more credible and 
distract attention from less accurate target prices. Using propensity score matching to control 
for selection bias, combined with a difference-in-differences estimation to allow for company- 
and analyst-specific effects, we estimate the effect of supplementing target prices with a BBA 
on the target price accuracy of US stocks. We find that target prices are significantly more 
accurate, both statistically and economically, when analysts supplement them with a BBA. 
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Equity analysts face conflicting incentives that influence their decision making. Research 
shows that analyst target price accuracy is limited and attributes this to a lack of analysts’ 
incentives to improve their accuracy. This has resulted in an on-going debate about the 
usefulness of target prices. Asquith et al. (2005) examine 818 target prices issued during 
1997–1999 by members of Institutional Investor’s All-American Research Team achieving at 
least one First Team ranking and find that 54.3% of target prices are accurate in the sense that 
the stock price equals or exceeds the target price at some time during the ensuing twelve 
months. Examining 1,000 analyst reports on German stocks during 2002–2004, Kerl (2011) 
finds a target price accuracy of 56.5%. For 10,939 target prices during 2000–2006 for 98 
companies listed on the Milan Stock Exchange, Bonini et al. (2010) report an accuracy of 
33.1%. They also report average target price errors of 37% for strong buy recommendations, 
21% for buy recommendations, falling to 10% for hold recommendations and 7% for sell 
recommendations, and rising to 29% for strong sell recommendations. Bradshaw et al. (2012) 
find an accuracy of 64% and an error of 45% for 492,647 target prices for US stocks during 
2000–2009.  
Research also studies the factors that influence target price accuracy, including analyst 
optimism (Asquith et al., 2005), the number of reports published by an analyst (Bonini et al., 
2010), analyst valuation model choice (Demirakos et al., 2010), the text-based information 
depth of analyst reports (Kerl, 2011), the collective reputation of analysts (Bonini et al., 
2011), and past forecast accuracy (Bradshaw et al., 2012). A previously unstudied factor is the 
uncertainty of analyst forecasts (Pope, 2003). We examine the effect of assessing and 
incorporating investment risk and uncertainty into analysts’ valuations via a bull-bear analysis 
(BBA) on the accuracy of their target prices. 
Analysts use alternative valuation models to generate their target prices, the most popular 
being price-earnings multiples and the discounted cash flow model. The choice depends on 
company characteristics and analyst preferences (Demirakos et al., 2010). The inputs to these 
valuation models necessarily affect target prices, so information uncertainty surrounding these 
inputs affects target price accuracy.
1
 In setting target prices, therefore, analysts have to make 
assumptions, explicitly or implicitly, about risk. One way in which they incorporate this into 
their reports is by supplementing their target price with an explicit risk assessment in the form 
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of a BBA. In a BBA, analysts assess the effect of alternative scenarios on target prices, by 
changing valuation model inputs in at least two scenarios, usually upside- and downside-
cases. They consider the earnings, cash flows, dividends, and discount rate of the company 
under best and worst case scenarios, assign probabilities to each scenario, and calculate the 
target price as the expected value.
2
 A BBA can improve the assessment and presentation of 
investment uncertainty, by recognizing a stock’s upside potential and downside risk.  
When analysts include a BBA in their reports, they produce two outputs, commonly named 
bull and bear case target prices, to support the target price highlighted in their report 
summary. Combined with the stock price, the target price along with the bull and bear target 
prices imply not only the analyst’s estimate of the future expected stock return but also an 
investment risk assessment (Damodaran, 2010). The bull–bear range scaled by the stock price 
at the time of announcement should be higher for riskier investments. Joos et al., (2012) use a 
variant of this metric, which they refer to as the ‘spread’, to proxy for analyst uncertainty 
about firms’ fundamental values. By examining the association between the bull–bear spread 
and company-specific risk factors and between the spread and target price error, they show 
that analysts’ scenario-based valuation estimates reflect and convey information about the 
risks and return potential affecting firm valuations. This suggests that a BBA can improve an 
analyst’s understanding of company risk. We find that analysts’ reports often include words to 
the effect that ‘our bull/bear analysis indicates a favorable risk/reward’ implying that bull and 
bear target prices convey information for risk assessment.  
A BBA may therefore be a useful risk assessment tool for valuing companies. It can help 
investors envision possible future states of the world and raise their awareness of a stock’s 
upside and downside potential. While it does not replace expected cash flows or earnings with 
certainty equivalents, a BBA remedies a shortcoming of traditional valuation by accounting 
for the uncertainty of analyst valuations. Analysts can use a BBA to compensate for weak 
valuation model assumptions or estimates or to compensate for an unpredictable future 
(Thomas, 2001). A BBA can therefore improve the quality of analyst valuations, enhancing 
risk assessments and the results of valuations, in the form of more accurate target prices.  
On the other hand, a BBA may disguise the underperformance of aggressive analysts. 
More accurate target prices are not an automatic outcome of disclosing a BBA. Analysts may 
report a BBA to compensate for a less accurate target price, allowing them to argue that the 
actual price falls in the bull–bear range. Reporting a BBA may make it easier for analysts to 
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bias their target prices to generate investment commissions. Disclosing a BBA may placate 
investors when the target price is biased upwards to curry favour with a company.  
Given the increasing popularity of target prices, a natural question to ask is whether a BBA 
improves the quality of analyst target prices. We answer this question by examining how 
including a BBA affects target price accuracy, where target price accuracy measures the 
ability of target prices to predict future stock prices.  
Using propensity score matching (PSM) combined with difference-in-differences (DD), we 
analyze the performance of analyst target prices supported by a BBA. PSM combined with 
DD allows us to compare the target price accuracy of BBA and non-BBA reports controlling 
for unobserved effects. This analysis shows that analysts are more likely to supplement target 
prices with a BBA when they face higher information uncertainty in terms of company age, 
stock liquidity, and company size, and higher company risk indicated by a negative return on 
assets and higher leverage. The analysis also shows that analysts are more likely to provide a 
BBA when they have affiliation-related incentives, but are less likely to provide a BBA when 
their forecasts are bold or in the presence of high institutional ownership. The DD matching 
estimation shows that target prices are more accurate when analysts supplement them with a 
BBA, with the estimated counterfactual target price error in the absence of a BBA being 23.7 
percent higher.  
There are two broader motivations for studying the impact of a BBA on target price 
accuracy. First, Pope (2003) suggests there are four fundamental determinants of analyst 
forecast quality: information, predictability, skill, and incentives. Information refers to the 
quality of valuation model inputs, while predictability captures fundamental uncertainty in the 
forecast output. Skill captures analyst forecasting ability and incentives reflect the conflicts of 
interest arising from analysts’ competing roles. Pope (2003, p. 277) argues that ‘forecast 
quality cannot be defined or measured independently of characteristics of predictability.’ The 
literature on target price quality studies factors relating to analyst skills and incentives but 
neglects the impact of the quality of analyst forecasting inputs and the uncertainty of the 
valuation outcome. Our study fills this gap by investigating how assessing and incorporating 
investment risk and uncertainty into analysts’ valuation models affects the quality of their 
target prices. Second, Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), introduced by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission in October 2000, banned U.S. companies from making selective, 
private disclosures to analysts. Previously, analysts depended heavily on access to 
management as their main source of information (Lang and Lundholm, 1993, 1996). Reg FD 





difficult to forecast future earnings (Bailey et al., 2003). It also resulted in increased 
information uncertainty and complexity of the forecasting task, driving analysts to search 
privately for additional information. Analyst access to private information was further 
restricted following the Global Research Analyst Settlement in December 2002, which 
penalized analysts of top investment banks for issuing overly optimistic forecasts. De Franco 
et al. (2007) report evidence of a reduction in analyst misleading behavior after the settlement. 
Although these regulations helped protect investors, they left analysts in a difficult position by 
putting pressure on them not to bias their forecasts. Analysts abide by the regulations at the 
expense of jeopardizing their relationships with company managers and reducing their access 
to timely information. One way in which analysts can offset the effect of the loss of private 
information on the quality of their forecasts is by disclosing a BBA. But disclosing a BBA 
may also allow analysts to distract attention from bias in their forecasts.   
Our analysis contributes to the literature on the content of analyst reports (Previts et al., 
1994; Rogers and Grant, 1997; Asquith et al., 2005), although our study differs from previous 
research in that it is the first to establish a link between the content of analyst reports and the 
quality of the forecast output. Analysts have only recently started to include a valuation 
scenario section in their reports and to highlight a BBA.
3
 We acknowledge that there may be 
an association between target price quality and other content of analysts' reports. However, as 
the BBA is more visible to investors and is directly related to the target price output, unlike 
other supplemental information, it is more relevant for target price accuracy. We therefore 
expect the findings of our study to improve our understanding of the determinants of analyst 
target price accuracy. The study should be of interest to academics wishing to understand the 
properties of analyst target prices and to investors wanting to assess the quality of analyst 
report outputs. It should also be of interest to investment banks trying to improve the quality 
of their research and to financial economists trying to find a way to distinguish ex ante which 
analysts are more accurate.  
2. Prior research and hypothesis development 
Evidence shows that target price revisions are associated with significant and immediate 
market reactions (Brav and Lehavy, 2003; Asquith et al., 2005; Da and Schaumburg, 2011). 
This quantifies the value of including target prices in analyst reports and suggests that 
knowing the determinants of target price quality is relevant to investors. These issues are 
                                                          





especially relevant when other research finds that investment portfolios formed on target 
prices generate returns that are substantially lower than ex ante returns implied by target 
prices (Brav and Lehavy, 2003; Barber et al., 2001) and that the market underreacts to target 
price revisions (Kreutzmann et al., 2010).  
Target price accuracy has received considerable attention in the recent literature (Asquith 
et al., 2005; Bonini et al., 2010; Demirakos et al., 2010; Kerl, 2011; Bonini et al., 2011; 
Bradshaw et al., 2012). This research finds larger target price errors associated with higher 
target price boldness (Demirakos et al., 2010; De Vincentiis, 2010; Kerl, 2011), suggesting 
that analyst optimism reduces accuracy. On the other hand, De Vincentiis (2010) and Kerl 
(2011) find no effect of analyst affiliation on target price accuracy. Therefore, the literature 
does not offer conclusive evidence on whether analyst incentives reduce target price accuracy. 
Evidence on analyst ability is also limited. Bradshaw et al. (2012) examine the accuracy of 
target prices and whether analysts have persistent differential forecasting ability. While they 
find evidence of such persistence, they report that the differential abilities are economically 
trivial. Using the number of equity reports issued by an analyst to proxy for analyst 
experience, Bonini et al. (2010) hypothesize that more experience leads to higher target price 
accuracy, following the learning curve hypothesis, but fail to find supporting evidence. De 
Vincentiis (2010), however, shows that the number of firms covered by the analyst and 
analyst company-specific experience improve target price accuracy. Demirakos et al. (2010) 
present evidence of analyst ability to make intelligent valuation model choices. Their 
evidence suggests that analysts select a valuation model that is appropriate to the difficulty of 
the valuation task and that accuracy does not vary with valuation model choice after 
accounting for this. 
The literature also examines factors relating to company risk. Evidence on the effect of 
company size on target price accuracy is mixed. Some research shows that company size 
reduces forecast accuracy (Bonini et al., 2010) while other research finds that target prices are 
more accurate for larger companies (Demirakos et al., 2010; Kerl, 2011). Bonini et al. (2010) 
find that momentum and loss making firms are associated with higher forecast errors. Stock 
price volatility reduces accuracy according to Demirakos et al. (2010), De Vincentiis (2010), 
and Kerl (2011). Information uncertainty is also likely to influence analyst behavior. Evgeniou 
et al. (2010) show that low ability analysts tend to herd when information uncertainty is low 
while they deviate significantly from the consensus when information uncertainty is high. In 
contrast, high ability analysts tend not to change their degree of deviation from the consensus 





willing to take a risk when information uncertainty is high because high ability analysts are 
also likely to have high forecast errors due to the uncertain information environment.  
In this paper, we examine the effect of a BBA on analyst target price accuracy. We first 
explore the determinants of whether an equity report includes a BBA. No prior research 
studies the underlying incentives and reasons for supplementing target prices with a BBA. We 
predict that the level of uncertainty about the company’s future performance determines 
whether a report includes a BBA. When investment in a stock is associated with high 
uncertainty, the company’s actual cash flows or earnings can diverge substantially from 
expectations making it difficult to project target prices. We conjecture that when analysts are 
uncertain about their valuation model inputs, they are more likely to support their target prices 
with a BBA. We test the following BBA information uncertainty hypothesis.  
H1: Equity analysts supplement valuations with a BBA when there is greater information 
uncertainty about firm value.  
Analyst incentives may also determine the choice to provide a BBA. On the one hand, 
analysts may have incentives to sacrifice accuracy in order to generate trading commissions 
and underwriting business for their bank and to maintain access to management. On the other 
hand, they have career concerns relating to their reputation and star ranking. Analysts facing 
greater conflicts of interests may provide a BBA in an attempt to signal that their forecasts are 
credible and hide their bias. This leads to the BBA analyst incentives hypothesis.    
H2: Equity analysts supplement valuations with a BBA when they face higher incentives to 
bias their forecasts. 
After examining the determinants of whether a report includes a BBA, we test the effect of 
this on analyst target price error. There are two possible outcomes to this analysis. A BBA can 
improve or reduce target price accuracy depending on analyst incentives.  
A BBA can improve target price accuracy by helping analysts to account for information 
uncertainty in their valuations. Zhang (2006a) shows that analyst forecast error generally 
increases with greater information uncertainty, being positive in the case of good news and 
negative in the case of bad news. Because a BBA requires analysts to examine how changes 
in underlying fundamentals affect firm value, it may reduce their tendency to underestimate or 
overestimate the effect of information uncertainty on value and consequently reduce forecast 
error. Disclosing a BBA achieves this goal of reducing analyst error ‘by forcing analysts to 
think more carefully and to critique their analysis more deeply with the goal of minimizing 
the impact of behavioral bias’ (Srinivasan and Lane, 2011, p. 6). Moreover, the information 





understanding of analyst valuations and their assessment of risk. Interpreting a target price 
supplemented with a BBA is more meaningful than interpreting a target price in isolation. 
Supplementing target price with a BBA provides investors with a richer set of information to 
assess whether the target price is associated with a larger upside potential or downside risk. A 
BBA is particularly useful to investors because by making risk explicit, it gives information 
about the ‘unknown’ and increases the credibility of analyst valuations, whereas a target price 
estimate on its own conveys a ‘false sense of certainty and accuracy’ and does not allow 
investors to understand analysts’ assessments of the risk–reward trade-off associated with the 
investment (Srinivasan and Lane, 2011, p. 4). A BBA may, therefore, improve the investor 
response to information contained in analyst target prices and reduce the effect of information 
uncertainty on the market reaction.  
On the other hand, a BBA might not be effective in reducing analyst forecast error if 
analysts provide a BBA in an attempt to signal credibility and disguise their biased forecasts. 
This leads to our second hypothesis, the main hypothesis of the paper. This hypothesis 
examines whether, controlling for the factors that determine whether a report includes a BBA, 
reporting a BBA increases target price accuracy. 
H3: Supplementing a valuation with a BBA improves target price accuracy. 
 
3. Sample and data  
We use a cross-sectional sample of equity reports covering companies listed on U.S. stock 
markets. We download equity reports from Investext issued during January 2008 to December 
2009. This is the first period when a reasonable number of observations is available for 
analysis and, because these data are hand-collected, we limit the sample period to two years.  
The sample comprises two main groups: reports with bull and bear target prices (BBA 
reports) and reports with no such analysis (non-BBA reports). We use Investext’s search 
facility to identify our samples. We search Investext equity reports using combinations of 
natural logic statements to identify (BBA) reports that contain words commonly used to refer 
to scenario analysis such as bull case and bear case, high case and low case, upside case and 
downside case, etc.
4
 To identify common words that analysts use to refer to bull and bear 
target prices, we analyze around 950 (out-of-sample) reports. We then use negative natural 
logic combinations in the search query to generate (non-BBA) reports that do not include any 
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of the above words. We read the generated analyst reports from both search queries in entirety 
to ensure that no analyst report tabulates a BBA without using the specific words in our 
search queries. This procedure validates our research method and provides further assurance 
that our classification of reports into BBA and non-BBA samples is accurate.  
Several financial databases summarize earnings forecasts, recommendations, and target 
prices (e.g., Zacks Investment Research, First Call and I/B/E/S). There are currently no 
databases, however, providing similarly compiled information on bull and bear case target 
prices. The only way to collect this information is to read individual analyst reports and hand 
code their content. Therefore, we hand code reports for the following 12 data fields: report 
title, stock official ticker, report number (Investext Plus identifier), name of investment bank 
or research department, analyst name, report date, current target price, current market price, 
bull case target price, bear case target price, current EPS forecast, and current stock 
recommendation. We record recommendation levels rather than recommendation changes 
following Kreutzmann et al. (2010).  
We exclude all reports that provide a scenario analysis but no target price. We also exclude 
a small number of reports that include a scenario analysis but only for EPS forecasts. We 
exclude reports that disclose a target price or earnings forecast in a foreign currency for cross-
listed firms and with no target price or earnings estimate in US dollars. Applying these filters 
eliminates 152 reports. Finally, the only large research department not contributing to 
Investext is Goldman Sachs. Therefore, our sample does not include Goldman Sachs reports. 
While unavoidable, this may bias our sample. Our final sample comprises 7,692 equity 
reports, 1,710 companies, 47 (Fama and French, 1997) industries, 964 analysts, and 55 
brokerage firms. Table 1 gives the industry distribution of the sample reports.
5
 Table 2 lists 
the investment brokerage firms in the treated and control samples. Among the brokerage 
firms, Morgan Stanley contributes 75% of the BBA reports.
6
  
[Tables 1 and 2 no earlier than here] 
Other data sources are: I/B/E/S for the number of analysts following a company, the 
stock recommendation translation file, historical target prices, and consensus EPS estimates; 
CRSP for company age, stock prices, and returns; Compustat for cash flows, actual earnings, 
leverage data, and S&P credit rating changes; Thomson One Banker for investment bank 
affiliation; Institutional Investor for All-American Research Team Analysts data; and 
Thomson Reuters 13f files for institutional ownership data.  
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We match Thomson One Banker underwriter names to Investext broker names using the 
I/B/E/S estimator translation file. We define affiliated investment banks as those serving as 
either lead or co-lead managers for a given equity or debt offering. All others are unaffiliated.
7
  
We include all types of equity offerings: initial public offerings (IPO), seasoned equity 
offerings (SEO), and convertible stock offerings in the affiliation sample. Prior research 
classifies an investment bank that offers underwriting services to a company at the most 
recent IPO, SEO, or debt offering at the beginning of the sample period as affiliated and 
remaining affiliated throughout the sample period as long as the company does not issue 
another offering in which the investment bank is not involved. In our sample, the affiliation 
variable takes the value one starting from the offering announcement date and ending at most 
one year after the offering. Ideally, the affiliation dummy should take the value one when the 
corporate finance department and the issuer sign the mandate letter. Since this information is 
not available, the affiliation designation indicates the affiliation relationship starting from the 
offering announcement. After completing the distribution of securities, the investment bank is 
no longer at risk from the issue and is likely to focus on new clients and offerings. Even if the 
relationship continues, it will not be as strong as at the time of the offering. We thus assume 
that, in the absence of further developments, the affiliation relationship between the 
investment bank and issuer ends after one year.  
We collect data on analyst rankings from Institutional Investor. Every year, Institutional 
Investor surveys fund managers and other institutional investors to determine, by industry, the 
analysts who provided the top quality research during the year. Money managers nominate 
and evaluate analysts based on their accuracy, frequency of coverage, and the market reaction 
to their forecasts. Institutional Investor tabulates the results and announces the All-America 
Research Team in its October issue. It also tabulates the top ten investment banks for the year. 
We collect these data for 2007–2009 and match the data with the analyst reports. If analysts 
are in the All-America Team, we classify them as star analysts in all research report 
observations following the Institutional Investor October issue until the next October issue.
8
 
Because Institutional Investor does not follow an analyst or investment bank coding that 
matches Investext data, we match the Institutional Investor dataset, which comes in a text file, 
with our other data files using analyst last name, first initial, and research department. 
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Our main variable of interest is target price accuracy. The literature uses several target 
price accuracy measures (see, for example, Asquith et al., 2005; Demirakos et al., 2010; 
Bradshaw et al., 2012; Bonini et al., 2010; De Vincentiis, 2010). We follow Demirakos et al. 
(2010) in calculating our (inverse) accuracy measure, TPError, as the absolute value of the 
target price minus the stock price at the end of the target price forecast horizon divided by the 
current market price.  
 
4.  Research design  
We want to measure the impact of disclosing a BBA on target price accuracy. Analysts 
may choose to supplement a report on a particular company with a BBA, however, making it 
difficult to determine causation. Also, we observe target price accuracy resulting from the 
analyst decision, but not from decisions not made. We cannot, therefore, evaluate the effects 
of the analyst decision by comparing outcome differences for a given target price.  
The decision to issue a report including a BBA is unlikely to be random. Information 
uncertainty and analyst incentives likely determine this choice. Moreover, the impact across 
companies, or the treatment effect, is unlikely to be homogenous. These differential effects 
also influence the analyst decision process and so are likely to correlate with the treatment 
effect. Consequently, an estimate of the treatment effect using ordinary least squares (OLS) is 
biased and suffers from an identification problem (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000).  
To eliminate selection bias, we consider the target price performance consequences of 
including a BBA using propensity score-matching (PSM) (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) 
combined with a difference-in-differences (DD) analysis. PSM helps solve the problem of 
selection bias by balancing observed differences between groups. However, it relies on the 
assumption that observables determine selection. If there are unobserved analyst or company 
effects, results from PSM are biased. For example, while information uncertainty is 
measurable, analyst incentives are not completely measurable.
9
 Therefore, we combine the 
PSM methodology with a DD analysis. A combined PSM–DD procedure lets us compare the 
target price accuracy of BBA and non-BBA reports while accounting for unobserved or 
unmeasured analyst and company effects, so the unobserved bias cancels out through 
differencing. This combined analysis should be more robust and has the potential to 
significantly improve the quality of the results (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000).  
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The propensity score is the conditional probability of receiving treatment. The treatment of 
interest is a BBA supporting target prices. The modelling problem is evaluating the causal 
effect of supporting analyst target prices with a BBA on TPError. The effect of including a 
BBA in report j is   
1 0
j j
TPError TPError       (1) 
where 1
j
TPError  is the target price error when the analyst report includes a BBA, and 
0
j
TPError  is the error of the (hypothetical) target price had the analyst report not included a 
BBA, The fundamental problem of causal inference is that we do not observe the 
counterfactual, 0
j
TPError . To estimate this, we employ PSM to pair each BBA report with a 
set of non-BBA reports, based on observable variables. The propensity score model estimates 
the conditional probability of including a BBA given observable features of analysts and the 
company. Accordingly, we first estimate the probability that an analyst report includes a BBA 
(i.e., the propensity score) using the logistic regression,  
( 1) ( )
ijkt ik
P BBA h X β       (2) 
where ijktBBA  is a dummy variable that indicates whether report j by analyst k for company i at 
time t includes a BBA, X is a vector of covariates determining the analyst decision, and P  
denotes the propensity score.  
Using kernel matching, we match BBA to non-BBA reports based on the estimated 
propensity scores.
10
 Kernel matching computes the distance of propensity scores of each BBA 
report from all non-BBA reports. Denoting a non-BBA report by j*, kernel matching 
calculates a weighting function,
  ,  *w j j , for each report j by assigning a large value of  ,  *w j j  
to a j* that is a short distance in terms of propensity score from j, and a small value of  ,  *w j j  
to a j* that is a long distance in propensity score from j (Guo and Fraser, 2010, p. 259). The 







ATT TPError w j j TPError
n
  
      (3) 
where n is the number of matched BBA reports, 1
j








w j j TPError  distinguishes the 
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kernel-based matching approach as it measures the weighted average target price error of all 
non-BBA reports that match to report j on the propensity score.
11
 
A major advantage of this matching method is that we can combine it with other methods 
to produce more accurate estimates and relax some strong conditions. Heckman et al. (1997, 
1998) introduce a special version of the estimated average treatment effect on the treated 
using DD. They suggest combining PSM with DD to eliminate the selection bias that stems 
from unobserved characteristics. Combining PSM with DD allows for an unobserved 
determinant of BBA disclosure as long as this is a separable component of the error term. In 
panel data studies, the separable component is naturally time-specific, as both treated and 
control groups are measured pre- and post-treatment. Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) suggest 
extending PSM–DD to repeated cross-sections of data. In our analysis, the separable 
component of the error-term is analyst-specific. This means our matching analysis considers 
whether the fact that an analyst issuing a report is the type of analyst who discloses a BBA 
affects differences in target price accuracy. 
The DD estimator for the repeated cross-sections is 
* * *
1 0 0 01 ( , *) ( , *)( )
A j C j B j D
DD TPError w j j TPError w j j TPError TPError
n   
    
        (4) 
where our sample comprises four groups, namely 
A: BBA reports (the treatment group); 




C: non-BBA reports by the analysts in A (control group for BBA analysts); and 
D: contemporaneous non-BBA reports for the companies in C, by the analysts in B 
(control group for non-BBA analysts). 
To measure the impact of disclosing a BBA on target price accuracy, we estimate the 
kernel-based PSM–DD estimator taking as inputs BBA-analyst and BBA-company dummies, 
the propensity scores estimated in the logistic model of equation (2) to match observations 
from group A with observations from groups B, C, and D, and the identified matched pairs. 
We perform the matching three times for each BBA report (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000) to 
identify the matched pairs from the treatment and control groups and to compute the 
differences in accuracy between groups A and C and groups B and D. We then obtain the DD 
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 Nearest neighbour matching is sensitive to definition. Kernel matching is less sensitive and more efficient 
(Guo and Fraser, 2010).  
12
 To get a reasonable number of observations, the control group observations are from reports issued within a 





estimate using equation (4).
13
 The combined PSM–DD approach extends the conventional DD 
estimator by conditioning on the propensity score and estimating the differences semi-
parametrically. The PSM–DD estimator is more robust than the conventional DD estimator 




5.  Results 
 
5.1. Determinants of whether a report includes a BBA 
To estimate the propensity score for each sample observation, we identify the variables 
determining whether an equity report includes a BBA. While no prior research studies why 
equity reports include a scenario analysis, some research suggests reasons and situations that 
call for this. We draw on this literature to specify the propensity-score model.  
One factor that may affect whether an analyst discloses a BBA is information uncertainty. 
Uncertainty can arise from the complexity of the forecasting task or from the information 
available to analysts. When a stock is associated with high risk, the company’s cash flows or 
earnings can diverge substantially from expectations making it difficult to project target 
prices. The literature suggests several proxies for uncertainty. Zhang (2006b) shows that 
information uncertainty stems from the volatility of the company’s underlying fundamentals 
and poor information available to analysts. He uses six measures of information uncertainty: 
company size, company age, analyst coverage, analyst forecast dispersion, and return and 
cash flow volatility. Company size measures uncertainty because small companies have less 
information and disclosures available to the market. Analyst following proxies for company 
disclosure practices. More analysts follow companies with more informative disclosures and 
less uncertainty (Lang and Lundholm, 1996). 
The second factor that may determine the analyst decision to provide a BBA is analyst 
incentives. Analysts face reputational concerns and have incentives to signal credibility to 
maintain their reputation and disguise their forecast bias. While we cannot observe analyst 
incentives, previous research suggests several proxies to control for these incentives. Analyst 
bias can be driven by incentives to generate trading and underwriting business for their banks 
(Cowen et al., 2006; Jackson, 2005) and to maintain access to management. It can also be 
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 To implement this approach in Stata, we use the diff module of Villa (2009). 
14 Applying DD to a cross-section assumes the same analyst-effect holds across the treatment and control groups. 
Combining PSM with DD relaxes this assumption and can achieve a better job of controlling for observable 





curbed by the presence of high institutional ownership (Ackert and Athanassakos, 2003) and 
reputational and career concerns (Fang and Yasuda, 2009; Hong and Kubik, 2003).  
Building on this, we estimate the following logistic propensity-score model, which 
estimates the probability that analyst reports include a BBA conditional on observable 
features of analyst expertise and the level of uncertainty about the company’s future 
performance. We also include variables that directly affect target price accuracy. 
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 (5) 
Equation (5) includes two groups of variables. The first consists of eight information 
uncertainty proxies that are likely to affect the choice to supplement a valuation with a BBA: 
company age (Age), stock liquidity (Liq), cash flow volatility (CVol), earnings volatility 
(EVol), stock return volatility (RVol), the number of analysts following a company (Cov), 
company size (ln Cap), and target price dispersion (TPDisp).
15
 Our first hypothesis predicts a 
positive association between information uncertainty and the likelihood that a report includes 
a BBA. We expect company age, stock liquidity, company size, and analyst coverage to have 
negative coefficients, and cash flow volatility, earnings volatility, stock return volatility, and 
target price dispersion to have positive coefficients.
16
  
[Table 3 no earlier than here] 
The second group consists of variables that are related to analyst incentives: forecast 
boldness (Bold), an institutional investor star analyst dummy (Star), institutional ownership 
(InstOwn), an analyst affiliation dummy (Affltd), and analyst company-specific experience 
(Exp). Target price boldness is the return implied by the target price at the report release date. 
Previous research finds a negative relation between target price boldness and accuracy 
(Demirakos et al., 2010); aggressive analysts are more likely to be biased since they have 
higher confidence in their private information. Analyst affiliation is likely to compromise 
analyst objectivity and bias outputs (O'Brien et al., 2005). We expect forecast boldness and 
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 Table 3 defines all the variables.  
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It is important to note that many of the uncertainty proxies are likely to influence target price accuracy since 
accuracy likely improves with lower fundamental risk and lower information uncertainty. Hence, it is not 






analyst affiliation to reduce target price accuracy and therefore to have positive coefficients in 
equation (5) in support of the analyst incentives hypothesis. Previous research shows a 
positive relation between forecast accuracy and analyst reputation (Stickel, 1992) and firm 
specific-experience (Mikhail et al., 1997; Clement, 1999). Star and experienced analysts, 
unlike other analysts seeking recognition and ranking, may have lower reputational concerns. 
Consequently these factors may reduce analyst incentives to disclose a BBA. Analysts are 
also less likely to bias their forecasts for stocks highly visible to institutional investors. 
However, it is debatable whether analysts would disclose a BBA to cover their bias when 
valuing stocks with high institutional ownership.  
We include several control variables: stock recommendation categories (StrongBuy, 
Hold, Sell) control for the sensitivity of target price accuracy to analyst recommendations, 
while return on assets (ROA, NegROA), market to book ratio (M/B, NegM/B), and leverage 
(Lev) control for a company’s financial performance. We control for credit rating upgrades 
(CrdtUp) and downgrades (CrdtDown), building on evidence of the relation between target 
price revisions and credit rating changes (Bonini et al., 2009). We include a dummy for 
analyst revision frequency (LrgRevFreq) because analysts who make more frequent revisions 
are less likely to herd (Clement and Tse, 2005; Jegadeesh and Kim, 2010). We also expect 
analysts with higher EPS forecasts and target price deviations from consensus to be less likely 
to herd. We therefore control for analyst EPS deviation from consensus (EPSDev) and analyst 
target price deviation from consensus (TPDev). Other controls include stock price momentum 
(Momentum), target price forecast horizon (Horizon), and 47 industry dummies. We control 
for the forecast horizon because of its effect on accuracy (Sinha et al., 1997). This is an 
important control because not all target price forecasts in our sample have a 12-month 
forecast horizon. We include industry dummies to control for unmeasured industry-specific 
differences between treatment and control observations.  
Last, we include a Morgan Stanley dummy variable (Morgan) to control for the 
substantial concentration of Morgan Stanley reports in the treatment sample. Srinivasan and 
Lane (2011) point out that Morgan Stanley introduced the BBA framework with the aim of 
helping underperforming analysts improve their quantification of uncertainty. The ultimate 
goal of the framework was to encourage analysts to provide more useful information to clients 
and consequently increase analysts’ chances of receiving institutional investor votes. In our 
sample, we find that some Morgan Stanley reports include a BBA while others do not. This 
suggests that, in practice, during our sample period, analysts at Morgan Stanley retained some 





Stanley dummy is unlikely to control fully for the decision to include a BBA. We address the 
potential hidden analyst effect (e.g., analyst confidence) on the decision to include a BBA 
when we estimate the combined PSM–DD model.  
Table 4, panel A presents descriptive statistics for the full sample for these variables 
while panel B gives summary statistics for the treatment and control groups of BBA and non-
BBA reports and the results of mean and median differences tests between the two samples. 
The significant differences in means and medians between the two groups call for controlling 
using matching methods.  
[Table 4 no earlier than here] 
5.2. Univariate analysis  
We first compare the key characteristics of BBA and non-BBA analysts. If these 
characteristics differ, we need to control for them when examining differences in accuracy 
between the two groups. Table 5 summarizes mean and median values for the two groups. 
Unconditionally, BBA analysts are more likely to be star and affiliated analysts. They have 
significantly more experience than non-BBA analysts and they produce EPS and TP forecasts 
with higher deviations from the consensus. BBA analysts have above average revision 
frequency for the companies they cover. Therefore, BBA analysts are less likely to herd on 
the consensus. This deviation from consensus suggests that BBA analysts have more 
confidence in their private information and that they are more likely to be biased. The number 
of sell recommendations BBA analysts issue is higher. These results suggest that 
unconditionally, BBA analysts are not the worst performing analysts. However, BBA analysts 
are less likely to issue target prices below current prices, another indication that they are more 
likely to be biased. BBA analysts also have unconditionally larger forecast errors. The 
univariate analysis suggests significant differences in the characteristics of BBA and non-
BBA analysts. Nonetheless, it is not possible to draw conclusions about the characteristics of 
BBA analysts based on the unconditional results. Nor can we infer from this analysis based on 
the characteristics of BBA analysts whether they are more likely to have more or less accurate 
target prices.  
[Table 5 no earlier than here] 
Table 6 reports the results of a univariate analysis examining differences in mean and 
median target price accuracy between BBA and non-BBA reports. Panel A gives mean and 
median target price errors. We also divide the sample into two sub-samples depending on 





greater for the former than the latter, indicating that analysts issue target prices more often 
when news is positive. For the full sample and the two sub-samples, mean and median target 
price errors are lower for BBA reports than for non-BBA reports. The t- and z-tests in panels 
B and C show that the differences in means are significant between the BBA and non-BBA 
groups for the full sample and the two sub-samples. Differences in medians, however, are 
insignificant. In general, the results indicate that when analysts supplement their target prices 
with a BBA, they tend to be more conservative. This result is more pronounced when analysts 
communicate negative news to the market. 
[Table 6 no earlier than here] 
Table 7 reports the sample distribution by recommendation level. In the full sample, buy 
recommendations are the most common, followed by hold recommendations with strong buy 
and sell recommendations being less frequent. This is in line with the literature that analysts 
are reluctant to issue negative information on companies. These proportions vary across the 
BBA and non-BBA samples, but the proportions of (i) strong buy or buy and (ii) hold or sell, 
are similar across the two samples. Table 7, panel B compares accuracy by recommendation 
level and shows that the mean forecast error is lowest when analysts issue sell 
recommendations. Panel C tests for differences in accuracy between BBA and non-BBA 
reports by recommendation level and shows that BBA reports are more accurate for all but 
strong buy recommendations. This may indicate that analysts issue more conservative 
forecasts when they support their valuations with a BBA.  
[Table 7 no earlier than here] 
Analyzing the correlation matrix of the key variables (table 8) shows high correlations 
between information uncertainty variables such as ln Cap, EVol, and CVol. While including 
all three variables in a regression likely causes multicollinearity, this is not an issue for PSM 
because estimating the effects of individual covariates is not the main aim. We also note that 
while being a BBA analyst and a star analyst are positively associated, consistent with table 5, 
BBA reports and star analyst are negatively associated, consistent with table 4. This indicates 
that while star analysts are more likely than non-star analysts to issue a BBA report anywhere 
in the sample, non-star analysts issue a greater proportion of BBA reports. Obviously, this is 
an unconditional result that does not control for other factors. 







5.3. Testing for selection and hidden biases 
To justify our research design, we first test for the existence of selection bias. We add to 
the BBA determination equation (5), the target price accuracy equation, 
0 1 2 3i i i i i
TPError b b BBAanalyst b BBAcompany b BBA Controls e        (6) 
where BBAanalyst is a dummy that equals one if the analyst provides a BBA anywhere in the 
sample, BBAcompany is a dummy that equals one if the company receives a BBA anywhere 
in the sample, and BBA interacts the two dummies. The control variables include all 
information uncertainty proxies and variables affecting target price accuracy in equation (5). 
We estimate , the correlation between the error terms of the BBA determination and target 
price accuracy equations, , the standard error of the target price accuracy equation, and  = 
. We test whether  = 0 (or equivalently whether  = 0). If  = 0, there is no selection bias 
and we do not need to estimate the propensity score model. If   0, we need to control for 
selection bias. As χ2 = 22654.13 (p = 0.000), we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that  
is non-zero. Second, we test for hidden bias. As discussed earlier, PSM is not robust to hidden 
bias (i.e., the matching analysis assumes that only observables determine selection). An 
unobservable variable (e.g., analyst confidence about their information) that affects whether a 
report includes a BBA can introduce hidden bias. We use Rosenbaum’s bounds test to 
determine how strongly the unmeasured unobserved variable must affect treatment selection 
to weaken the results from a matching analysis alone.
17
 If the matching analysis results are 
sensitive to hidden bias, this justifies combining PSM with DD. Using Wilcoxon's signed-
rank test, the sensitivity analysis shows that the results of matching alone become sensitive to 
hidden bias at gamma = 1.01.
18
 As this is a small value (Guo and Fraser, 2010, p. 318), we 
conclude that our analysis is sensitive to hidden bias, and therefore, the analysis requires the 
PSM–DD combined estimation to control for additional bias.  
5.4 The propensity-score matching procedure  
Table 9 reports the results of the first stage of the PSM–DD estimation, which involves 
estimating propensity scores using equation (5). The table shows the determinants of whether 
a BBA supplements target price valuations. In testing our first hypothesis, we estimate the 
model in equation (5) excluding the Morgan Stanley dummy. Table 9, column 1 reports the 
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 We implement this test in Stata using the user-developed programme rbounds of Gangl (2004).  
18
 Gamma is a sensitivity parameter that measures the departure from random treatment assignment, where a 





results. The evidence suggests that analysts are more likely to include a BBA for companies 
with higher cash flow volatility, stock return volatility, and target price dispersion, and for 
larger firms. Analysts are also more likely to support valuations with a BBA for younger 
firms, and stocks with lower liquidity, earnings volatility, and analyst coverage. Consistent 
with our first hypothesis, coefficient signs on the information uncertainty proxies accord with 
expectations except for lnCap , where analysts are more likely to provide a BBA for larger 
firms. Because of the high correlations between the information uncertainty variables, the 
coefficients on some of the variables in column 1 are insignificant. When we estimate the 
model including each of the highly correlated variables one at a time, however, we get 
significant coefficients with the correct signs in each regression.  
[Table 9 no earlier than here] 
For the analyst incentive and control variables, we are more likely to observe a BBA with 
analyst affiliation, higher analyst experience, negative return on assets, higher market to book 
ratio, higher leverage, a credit rating upgrade, above average revision frequency, higher EPS 
deviation from consensus, higher target price deviation from consensus, higher stock price 
momentum, and sell recommendations. On the other hand, analysts are less likely to provide a 
BBA with higher forecast boldness, when an analyst is a star, with higher levels of 
institutional ownership, with strong buy and hold recommendations, following credit rating 
downgrades, and for target prices with shorter forecast horizons. The result that star analysts 
are less likely, conditionally, to disclose a BBA is consistent with our prediction that analysts 
disclose a BBA in the presence of factors that call for improving their credibility  and their 
relationship with institutional investors. Star analysts have less incentive to disclose a BBA 
than do analysts who have not achieved market recognition.  
We estimate the full model of equation (5), including the Morgan Stanley dummy, to 
estimate the propensity score and report the results in table 9, column 2. Following estimation 
of this logistic regression, we create a logit score and define the logit as the propensity score. 
We use the propensity score to identify the matched pairs between Groups A and C and 
between Groups B and D for our DD estimation.  
5.5 Covariate balance between treatment and control samples 
When matching observations on the propensity score, we impose a common support that 
causes the program to drop treatment observations with a propensity score above a maximum 
or below a minimum propensity score of the untreated observations. This ensures the program 





treatment and control groups are similar along observable dimensions except for the treatment 
dummy. To assess the covariate balance between the treatment and control groups, we 
calculate several measures of the balancing of variables across the treatment and control 
groups before and after matching. First, we conduct t-tests of the equality of means in the 
treated and untreated groups after matching. Table 10 reports means of the treatment and 
control groups with t-statistics and (two-tailed) p-values for the matching. The p-values 
indicate that the matching algorithm successfully balances most of the covariates; most t-tests 
are insignificant (p > 0.1). Second, we estimate the standardized bias after matching, together 
with the reduction in bias achieved (in percentage). The standardized bias is the difference in 
the sample means of the treated and control groups as a percentage of the square root of the 
average of the sample variances in the treated and control groups. As table 10 shows, after 
matching, the bias falls significantly for most covariates.  
[Table 10 no earlier than here] 
We also report overall measures of covariate balance before and after matching. The first 
is the pseudo-R
2
 from estimating the propensity score on all the variables in the logistic model 
before matching and the pseudo-R
2
 from the same logistic model on the matched samples. A 
low pseudo-R
2 
means there are no systematic differences in the distributions of the covariates 
between the treatment and control groups. Table 10, panel B reports pseudo-R
2
s and p-values 
of a likelihood-ratio test for the joint significance of the standardized differences between the 
treatment and control groups before and after matching. The likelihood ratio test checks 
whether these differences are jointly insignificant. The low pseudo-R
2
 (0.006) after matching 
and the insignificant likelihood ratio test support the hypothesis that both groups have the 
same covariate distribution after matching. The results of the four tests imply that there is no 
systematic difference in the distribution of covariates between the groups after matching.  
5.6 Estimating the average treatment effect using PSM combined with DD 
Table 11 reports the key results of the combined, semi-parametric PSM–DD matching 
estimation of the effect of supplementing target prices with a BBA. We use the estimated 
propensity score to match observations in group A with observations in groups B, C, and D. 
We then create an identifier for the matched A–B and C–D pairs. This step makes our cross-
section data sample similar to a panel in the sense that each observation in the treatment 
(control) group with a BBA analyst matches with at least one observation from the treatment 
(control) group with no BBA analyst, allowing us to compute the difference in target price 





treatment effect estimated from combining DD with PSM by computing the difference along 
the treatment dimension. The Base Line columns in table 11 give the target price errors for the 
two non-BBA analyst control groups, group D (reports by non-BBA analysts for companies 
for which BBA analysts do not include a BBA) and group B (reports by non-BBA analysts for 
companies for which BBA analysts include a BBA). Column B D  reports the difference in 
target price error between matched observations in groups B and D. Similarly, the Follow Up 
columns give the target price errors of the BBA analyst control and treatment groups, group C 
(reports by BBA analysts for companies for which BBA analysts do not include a BBA) and 
group A (reports by BBA analysts for companies for which BBA analysts include a BBA). 
Column A − C gives the difference in target price error between matched observations in 
groups A and C. Finally, the last column gives the DD estimate.  
[Table 11 no earlier than here] 
The difference in target price error between observations in the two BBA analyst groups, 
A and C, is significantly negative (−0.240, p = 0.000), indicating that the target price accuracy 
of BBA analysts is higher in reports on companies where they include a BBA. But this does 
not control for differences in the companies in these two groups. The difference in target price 
error between observations in the two non-BBA analyst groups, B and D, is also significantly 
negative (−0.124, p = 0.000), indicating that the target price accuracy of non-BBA analysts is 
also higher in reports on companies for which BBA analysts include a BBA. Nevertheless, the 
DD matching estimate is significantly negative (−0.116, p = 0.008), which confirms that, after 
controlling for unobserved analyst effects, supplementing valuations with a BBA achieves 
higher accuracy (lower forecast error). The DD matching estimate is also economically 
significant as, without the reduction of 11.6%, the target price error of BBA reports, of 48.9% 
would be 23.7% higher.  
 
6. Sensitivity analysis 
Our first sensitivity analysis involves estimating a regression-adjusted matching model. 
The semi-parametric PSM–DD analysis in table 11 does not estimate the relation between 
covariates and target price accuracy. It is useful, therefore, to combine matching with 
regression adjustment on covariates. Regression-adjusted matching can reduce the bias of the 
matching estimator by reducing any differences remaining between the matched treated and 
control observations after matching. This achieves a similar purpose to PSM–DD except it 





kernel-based matching, we construct a subsample consisting of all matched treated and 
control observations. We then estimate regression (6) to obtain the conventional DD 
estimator, controlling for observed covariates and unobserved (analyst-specific) 
heterogeneity. The parameter of interest on the variable BBA, 3b , measures the change in 
target price error due to supplementing target prices with a BBA. The results, in table 12, 
column 1 report the coefficient on BBA as −0.111, which is similar to our estimate in table 11.  
[Table 12 no earlier than here] 
Table 12, column 2 reports the results of a conventional DD estimation of the effect on 
target price error of supporting target prices with a BBA, using equation (6) on the full sample 
(with no prior matching). While subject to multicollinearity, this model gives an estimated 
treatment effect of −0.113 (p < 0.000), again similar to our estimate in table 11. These results 
imply that supporting target prices with a BBA reduces the forecast error. The coefficient on 
BBAanalyst is positive, indicating that BBA analysts are on average more inaccurate or biased 
than other analysts, consistent with the univariate analysis. The coefficient on the Morgan 
Stanley dummy is insignificant, indicating that controlling for this variable does not directly 
influence analyst target price accuracy.
19
 According to the DD estimation, target price 
accuracy improves with higher stock liquidity and credit rating changes, and for star analysts. 
Accuracy deteriorates with higher earnings, stock return volatility, target price dispersion, and 
target price boldness. These results support previous findings in the literature.  
Our second robustness test addresses the sensitivity of the estimated treatment effect to 
failure of the common support condition. Imposing the common support restriction results in 
175 dropped BBA reports. This means that 93 percent of the treatment group have common 
support. Although the number of observations dropped is small, deleting observations that fall 
outside the common support region can bias results. We therefore estimate the results without 
imposing the common support restriction and find no significant differences in the treatment 
effect (untabulated). The fact that these results do not differ implies that our results are not 
sensitive to failure of the common support condition. This accords with expectations, as 
Reynolds and DesJardins (2009) note that when the proportion of dropped observations is 
small, the estimated treatment effect is likely to be similar to the true treatment effect.  
Last, we estimate the treatment effect on target price accuracy of reporting a BBA using 
Heckman’s two stage selection model. This controls for any selection bias resulting from the 
decision to include a BBA, but it does not estimate the DD effect. In this model, we make 
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assumptions about the required exclusion restriction. We specify liquidity, earnings volatility, 
return volatility, target price dispersion, boldness, analyst star status, institutional ownership, 
analyst affiliation, analyst experience, recommendation levels, market to book ratio, credit 
rating upgrades, a large revision frequency dummy, momentum, target price forecast horizon 
and the BBA indicator as determining selection (i.e., including a BBA in the report). We 
specify company age, liquidity, cash flow volatility, earnings volatility, market capitalization, 
analyst star status, analyst affiliation, ROA, negative returns on assets, leverage, credit rating 
downgrades, EPS deviation from consensus, target price deviation from consensus and the 
Morgan Stanley dummy as the variables affecting target price accuracy. The results, not 
tabulated, show a significant negative coefficient on the BBA indicator (−0.033, p = 0.014). 
In this model, the sign and magnitude of the coefficient on BBA in the treatment equation 
measures the net impact of including a BBA on the target price error, net of observed 
selection bias. This means that, other things equal, supporting target prices with a BBA in 
equity reports reduces the target price forecasting error compared with reports that do not 
include a BBA. However, these results rely on strong assumptions about the specification of 
the selection equation. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
Understanding the value and usefulness of analyst target prices has recently become of 
interest to academics, practitioners, and investors. The contribution of this study is to analyze 
a new factor that is relevant for explaining target price accuracy, the presence of a bull–bear 
valuation analysis (BBA). We examine whether analysts who supplement their target prices 
with a BBA issue more accurate target prices.  
We conjecture that target price accuracy improves when analysts support their valuations 
with a BBA. In theory, a BBA can help analysts and investors assess a stock’s risk. A BBA 
can be crucial in calibrating the uncertainty analysts have about the future performance of a 
company. It is possible, however, that aggressive analysts use a BBA to conceal their bias, 
mislead investors, and communicate to the market that they are more credible. The recent rise 
in prominence of target prices coupled with the somewhat vague impression of their purpose 
motivates our investigation of whether a BBA reduces or increases analyst forecast error. We 
employ propensity-score matching combined with difference-in-differences to match 
observations with similar levels of uncertainty about future company performance but that 





We find that forecasting accuracy varies systematically depending on whether analysts 
report a BBA. Analysts achieve a statistically and economically significant improvement in  
their target price accuracy when they disclose a BBA and we conclude that including a BBA 
in equity reports adds information value. This finding has implications for investors who can 
have more confidence in target prices supported by a BBA.  
This study opens avenues for further research on analyst valuations. Through a BBA, 
analysts try to incorporate downside risk and upside potential into their target price estimates. 
Future research can investigate and provide more detail on how they do this. For example, do 
they adjust the discount rate or risk premium to reflect uncertainty or do they change their 
cash flow estimates? Analysts have started to embrace the idea of supplementing their reports 
with bull and bear target prices only recently. If investment banks recognize the value of 
analyst reports that include them, they may want to emphasize and expand resources to 
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Table 1. Sample distribution by industry 
 BBA Non-BBA  
Industry  Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Total 
Agriculture 24 0.99 1 0.02 25 
Aircraft 46 1.9 51 0.97 97 
Alcoholic Beverages 17 0.7 9 0.17 26 
Apparel 17 0.7 98 1.87 115 
Automobiles and Trucks 16 0.66 61 1.16 77 
Banking 106 4.38 237 4.52 343 
Business Services 138 5.7 600 11.43 738 
Business Supplies 15 0.62 49 0.93 64 
Candy and Soda 15 0.62 2 0.04 17 
Chemicals 21 0.87 115 2.19 136 
Coal 6 0.25 25 0.48 31 
Computers 82 3.39 324 6.17 406 
Construction 1 0.04 52 0.99 53 
Consumer Goods 39 1.61 73 1.39 112 
Construction Materials 1 0.04 55 1.05 56 
Defence 6 0.25 11 0.21 17 
Electrical Equipment 32 1.32 65 1.24 97 
Electronic Equipment 184 7.6 559 10.65 743 
Entertainment 30 1.24 111 2.12 141 
Fabricated Products 5 0.21 0 0.00 5 
Food Products 85 3.51 67 1.28 152 
Healthcare 11 0.45 111 2.12 122 
Insurance 101 4.17 112 2.13 213 
Machinery 67 2.77 141 2.69 208 
Measuring and Control Equip 39 1.61 126 2.40 165 
Medical Equipment 56 2.31 164 3.13 220 
Miscellaneous 30 1.24 67 1.28 97 
Nonmetallic Mining 4 0.17 23 0.44 27 
Personal Services 65 2.68 29 0.55 94 
Pharmaceutical Products 164 6.77 219 4.17 383 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 311 12.85 294 5.60 605 
Precious Metals 0 0 13 0.25 13 
Printing and Publishing 0 0 48 0.91 48 
Real Estate 0 0 13 0.25 13 
Recreational Products 0 0 36 0.69 36 
Restaurants, Hotel, Motel 0 0 73 1.39 73 
Retail 9 0.37 445 8.48 454 
Rubber and Plastic Products 45 1.86 11 0.21 56 
Shipbuilding, Railroad Eq 101 4.17 7 0.13 108 
Steel Works 3 0.12 37 0.71 40 
Telecommunications 26 1.07 118 2.25 144 
Textiles 151 6.24 8 0.15 159 
Tobacco Products 15 0.62 5 0.10 20 
Trading 57 2.35 237 4.52 294 
Transportation 60 2.48 160 3.05 220 
Utilities 177 7.31 74 1.41 251 
Wholesale 43 1.78 135 2.57 178 
Total 2,421 100 5,248 100 7,692 
Notes: The distribution of BBA and non-BBA sample reports by industry. Industry 












ARDOUR CAPITAL 0 3 3 
NATIXIS BLEICHROEDER 0 101 101 
AVONDALE PARTNERS LLC 0 82 82 
FERRIS, BAKER WATTS, INC. 0 12 12 
BARRINGTON RESEARCH ASSOCIATES INC 0 40 40 
BEAR STEARNS AND CO INC 1 33 34 
BERNSTEIN RESEARCH 0 17 17 
BOENNING AND SCATTERGOOD INC 1 26 27 
BREAN MURRAY, CARRET AND CO 0 56 56 
BUCKINGHAM RESEARCH GROUP, INC. 5 66 71 
CANACCORD GENUITY 0 201 201 
CANTOR FITZGERALD AND COMPANY 0 32 32 
HSBC GLOBAL RESEARCH 3 2 5 
CARIS & COMPANY 0 112 112 
CL KING AND ASSOCIATES 1 5 6 
C.K. COOPER & CO. 1 0 1 
CRAIG HALLUM CAPITA 0 80 80 
ROTH CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLC 2 112 114 
DESJARDINS SECURITIES 0 1 1 
OPPENHEIMER AND CO 7 122 129 
CREDIT SUISSE - NORTH AMERICA 92 871 963 
FOX-PITT, KELTON, INC. 9 8 17 
THINKEQUITY LLC 21 206 227 
J.J.B. HILLIARD, W.L. LYONS, INC. 0 36 36 
JANNEY MONTGOMERY SCOTT LLC 0 18 18 
JEFFERIES & COMPANY, INC. 14 341 355 
JESUP & LAMONT SECURITIES 0 39 39 
JPMORGAN 48 369 417 
KAUFMAN BROTHERS 0 93 93 
LADENBURG, THALMANN & CO. INC. 5 42 47 
DEUTSCHE BANK SECURITIES INC. 109 842 951 
RODMAN & RENSHAW, INC. 0 10 10 
MACQUARIE RESEARCH 5 34 39 
MAXIM GROUP LLC 0 38 38 
KEYBANC CAPITAL MARKETS 1 32 33 
SOLEIL-MEDIA METRICS 0 6 6 
MORGAN JOSEPH AND CO 0 26 26 
KEVIN DANN AND PARTNERS 0 10 10 
MORGAN STANLEY 1,817 54 1,871 
NEEDHAM & COMPANY 3 0 3 
WEDBUSH SECURITIES INC 1 204 205 
RBC CAPITAL MARKETS (US) 23 0 23 
RBC CAPITAL MARKETS (Canada) 20 115 135 
SUNTRUST ROBINSON HUMPHREY CAPITAL  201 180 381 
OCIETE GENERALE 0 7 7 
STANFORD FINANCIAL GROUP 12 81 93 
STERNE, AGEE & LEACH, INC. 4 256 260 
DOUGHERTY & CO., LLC 0 22 22 
SUSQUEHANNA FINANCIAL GROUP LLLP 2 78 80 
COLLINS STEWART LLC 13 55 68 
DAVENPORT & COMPANY LLC 0 38 38 
CIBC WORLD MARKETS INC. (CANADA) 0 5 5 
W.R. HAMBRECHT & CO. 0 8 8 
WALL STREET STRATEGIES 0 29 29 
ZACKS INVESTMENT RESEARCH 0 15 15 
Total  2,421   5,271 7,692 






Table 3. Variable definitions 
Symbol  Variable name Definition 
Affltd Affiliation dummy Equals one when the analyst is affiliated with the 
company through an investment banking 
relationship, zero otherwise.  
Age Company age Log of the number of years since the company’s 
data is first available on CRSP.  
BBA Bull–bear analysis 
dummy 
Equals one when the report includes a bull–bear 
analysis, zero otherwise. This is the interaction of 
BBAanalyst and BBAcompany.  
BBAanalyst BBA analyst dummy  Equals one when the report is by an analyst who 
discloses a BBA in the sample, zero otherwise.  
BBAcompany  BBA company dummy  Equals one when the report covers a company that 
receives a BBA in the sample, zero otherwise.  
Bold Target price boldness  Difference between the target price forecast and 
the current stock price divided by the current 
stock price.  
Buy Buy dummy Equals one when the analyst stock 
recommendation is Buy, zero otherwise.  
Cov Analyst coverage Log of the I/B/E/S number of analysts following 
the company in the previous year.  
CrdtUp Credit rating upgrade Equals one if Standard and Poor’s changes the 
credit rating of the company upward, zero 
otherwise.  
CrdtDown Credit rating downgrade Equals one if Standard and Poor’s changes the 
credit rating of the company downward, zero 
otherwise.  
CVol Cash flow volatility  Log of the standard deviation of the company’s 
cash flow from operations (Compustat data item 
308) over the previous five years.  
EPSdev EPS forecast deviation 
from consensus  
Absolute value of the difference between the 
current analyst EPS forecast and the mean 
consensus forecast. 
EVol Company earnings 
volatility  
Log of the standard deviation of the company’s 
actual earnings (Compustat data item 18) over the 
previous year.  
Exp Company coverage 
experience  
Number of years since the analyst first started 
providing coverage for the company.  
Hold  Hold dummy Equals one when the analyst stock 
recommendation is Hold, zero otherwise.  
Horizon Target price forecast 
horizon  
Target price forecast horizon, in months.  
InstOwn Level of institutional 
ownership 
Total number of shares held by institutional 
investors divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding.  
Lev Leverage ratio  The company’s debt-to-assets ratio (in percent) 
for the year before the publication of the analyst 
report.  
Liq Stock liquidity Highest ask price minus lowest bid price (over the 
preceding month) divided by the bid–ask 
midpoint over the month.  










Symbol  Variable name Definition 
LrgRevFreq Large revision frequency 
dummy  
Equals one if the number of target price revisions 
issued by a given analyst for a given stock in a 
given year is greater than the average number of 
revisions for that stock in that year, zero 
otherwise. 
M/B Market-to-book ratio The company’s market-to-book value ratio (if 
market-to-book ratio is positive). 
Liq Stock liquidity Highest ask price minus lowest bid price (over the 
preceding month) divided by the bid–ask 
midpoint over the month.  
Momentum  Price momentum  Log of the current price of the stock divided by 
the price of the stock 180 days before the release 
of the analyst report.  
Morgan  Morgan Stanley indicator  Equals one for all Morgan Stanley reports, zero 
otherwise. 
NegM/B Negative market-to-book 
ratio  
Equals one if the company’s market-to-book ratio 
is negative, zero otherwise.  
NegROA Negative return on assets 
ratio  
Equals one if the company’s return on asset is 
negative, zero otherwise.  
NegTP Negative target price Equals one if the analyst target price forecast is 
lower than the current market price, zero 
otherwise.  
TPDev Target price deviation 
from consensus  
Absolute value of the difference between the 
analyst target price forecast and the mean 
consensus target price forecast. 
TPDisp Target price forecast 
dispersion  
Standard deviation of all analyst target price 
forecasts during the previous quarter divided by 
current market price.  
TPError Target price absolute 
error 
Absolute value of the target price minus the stock 
price at the end of the target price forecast 
horizon divided by the current market price.  
ROA Return on assets The company’s return on assets (in percent) for 
the year before the publication of the analyst 
report (if return on assets is positive). 
RVol Return volatility  Standard deviation of weekly excess returns on 
the stock over the preceding month.  
Sell Sell dummy Equals one when the analyst stock 
recommendation is Sell, zero otherwise.  
Star Star analyst dummy Equals one if the analyst is an Institutional 
Investor star analyst in the year before the release 
of the current analyst forecast, zero otherwise.  
StrongBuy Strong buy dummy Equals one if the analyst stock recommendation is 







Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics, full sample (N = 7,692) 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
BBA 0.315 0.000 0.464 0.000 1.000 
BBAanalyst 0.670 1.000 0.470 0.000 1.000 
BBAcompany 0.378 0.000 0.485 0.000 1.000 
Age 2.651 2.743 0.964 −2.403 4.145 
Liq 0.224 0.169 0.172 0.024 1.669 
CVol 4.763 4.622 1.689 0.000 11.269 
EVol 4.654 4.586 1.678 −0.035 10.707 
RVol* 0.066 0.057 0.036 0.022 0.240 
Cov 2.337 2.398 0.606 0.000 3.555 
ln Cap 21.715 21.617 1.748 16.360 26.944 
TPDisp* 0.254 0.175 0.277 0.024 1.943 
Bold* 0.254 0.185 0.377 .−0.427 2.304 
Star 0.085 0.000 0.279 0.000 1.000 
InstOwn 0.784 0.807 0.223 0.000 1.843 
Affltd 0.122 0.000 0.328 0.000 1.000 
Exp 4.144 3.000 3.456 0.000 10.000 
StrongBuy 0.087 0.000 0.282 0.000 1.000 
Hold 0.387 0.000 0.487 0.000 1.000 
Sell 0.084 0.000 0.277 0.000 1.000 
ROA* 6.816 5.687 6.151 0.000 28.616 
NegROA 0.153 0.000 0.360 0.000 1.000 
M/B* 3.917 2.677 4.582 0.000 30.606 
NegM/B 0.020 0.000 0.139 0.000 1.000 
Lev* 21.019 19.748 17.241 0.000 50.722 
CrdtUp 0.047 0.000 0.213 0.000 1.000 
CrdtDown 0.046 0.000 0.210 0.000 1.000 
LrgRevFreq 0.431 0.000 0.495 0.000 1.000 
EPSDev* 0.341 0.130 0.612 0.000 4.060 
TPDev* 6.295 3.500 8.726 0.000 54.626 
TPError* 0.534 0.429 0.465 0.007 2.830 
Momentum  −0.218 −0.177 0.489 −2.926 3.098 
Horizon  11.837 12.000 1.104 1.000 24.000 
 







Panel B: Descriptive statistics: BBA and non-BBA reports 
 Mean Median Mean difference Median difference 
Variable BBA non-BBA BBA non-BBA t-stat p-value z-stat p-value 
Age 2.744 2.608 2.876 2.697 −5.739 0.000 −7.732 0.000 
Liq 0.189 0.240 0.145 0.182 12.331 0.000 15.102 0.000 
CVol 5.566 4.395 5.430 4.248 −29.826 0.000 −28.723 0.000 
EVol 5.387 4.318 5.359 4.167 −27.158 0.000 −25.824 0.000 
RVol* 0.060 0.069 0.051 0.059 10.213 0.000 14.118 0.000 
Cov 2.515 2.255 2.565 2.303 −17.832 0.000 −17.976 0.000 
ln Cap 22.616 21.301 22.561 21.176 −32.702 0.000 −31.098 0.000 
TPDisp* 0.222 0.270 0.157 0.186 7.043 0.000 9.351 0.000 
Bold* 0.252 0.254 0.196 0.179 0.274 0.784 −2.071 0.038 
Star 0.076 0.089 0.000 0.000 1.958 0.050 1.958 0.050 
InstOwn 0.763 0.793 0.784 0.820 5.553 0.000 7.632 0.000 
Affltd 0.219 0.078 0.000 0.000 −17.832 0.000 −17.475 0.000 
Exp 5.595 3.478 7.000 2.000 −26.018 0.000 −24.275 0.000 
StrongBuy 0.017 0.119 0.000 0.000 14.967 0.000 14.755 0.000 
Hold 0.335 0.411 0.000 0.000 6.371 0.000 6.354 0.000 
Sell 0.125 0.065 0.000 0.000 −8.936 0.000 −8.891 0.000 
ROA* 7.135 6.670 5.962 5.550 −3.083 0.002 −3.131 0.002 
NegROA 0.128 0.164 0.000 0.000 4.058 0.000 4.054 0.000 
M/B* 4.292 3.744 2.828 2.599 −4.878 0.000 −3.038 0.002 
NegM/B 0.022 0.019 0.000 0.000 −0.969 0.333 −0.969 0.333 
Lev* 23.791 19.745 22.824 17.285 −9.614 0.000 −10.689 0.000 
CrdtUp 0.058 0.042 0.000 0.000 −3.018 0.003 −3.016 0.003 
CrdtDown 0.045 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.473 0.636 0.473 0.636 
LrgRevFreq 0.483 0.407 0.000 0.000 −6.277 0.000 −6.262 0.000 
EPSDev* 0.441 0.296 0.170 0.120 −9.709 0.000 −8.617 0.000 
TPDev* 7.812 5.598 3.929 3.300 −10.405 0.000 −6.498 0.000 
TPError* 0.496 0.552 0.419 0.436 4.878 0.000 1.477 0.140 
Momentum  −0.146 −0.251 −0.092 −0.221 −8.814 0.000 −9.795 0.000 
Horizon  11.511 11.987 12.000 12.000 17.941 0.000 20.121 0.000 
Notes: Descriptive statistics for the sample variables. Panel A gives the mean, median, standard deviation, and 
minimum and maximum values of the variables for the full sample. Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the 
sample variables for reports including a bull–bear analysis (BBA sample) and reports with no bull–bear 
analysis (non-BBA sample). The sample includes 5,271 non-BBA reports and 2,421 BBA reports. Variables 







Table 5. Characteristics of BBA analysts 









analysts z-value p-value 
Star 0.107 0.039 −10.1 0.000 0.000 0.000 −10.0 0.000 
Affltd 0.164 0.037 −16.3 0.000 0.000 0.000 −16.0 0.000 
Exp 4.869 2.672 −27.5 0.000 5.000 2.000 −26.6 0.000 
EPSdev 0.379 0.265 −7.7 0.000 0.150 0.110 −7.4 0.000 
TPdev 6.662 5.548 −5.3 0.000 3.600 3.227 −4.5 0.000 
LrgRevFrq 0.456 0.380 −6.3 0.000 0.000 0.000 −6.3 0.000 
Sell 0.095 0.061 −5.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 −5.0 0.000 
NegTP 0.159 0.177 2.0 0.042 0.000 0.000 3.2 0.002 
TPError         
Full sample 0.543 0.516 −2.4 0.016 0.446 0.398 −3.7 0.000 
TP > current 
price 0.568 0.531 −2.9 0.004 0.473 0.416 −4.4 0.000 
TP ≤ current 
price 0.413 0.447 1.4 0.160 0.322 0.339 1.3 0.196 
Notes: Comparison of the characteristics of BBA and non-BBA analysts. BBA analysts are analysts who issue a bull–
bear analysis anywhere in the sample. Non-BBA analysts are analysts who do not issue a bull–bear analysis in the 
sample. The table gives the mean and medians of variables related to analyst characteristics and the results of mean and 
median differences tests. The means and medians are based on a sample of 5,155 BBA analyst reports and 2,537 non-












Table 6. Target price accuracy: univariate analysis 
Panel A: Mean and median TPError 
 N  Mean  Median  
Group   BBA Non-BBA BBA Non-BBA BBA Non-BBA 
Full Sample  2,421 5,271 0.496 0.552 0.419 0.436 
TP > Current price  2,068 4,347 0.517 0.574 0.447 0.460 
TP ≤ Current price  353 924 0.371 0.445 0.315 0.335 
Panel B:  TPError mean difference, two-tailed t-test  
 Full-sample TP > current price TP ≤ current price 
 t-value p-value t-value p-value t-value p-value 
 BBA and non-BBA 4.878 0.000 4.526 0.000 2.875 0.005 
Panel C : TPError median difference, two-tailed t-test 
 Full-sample TP > current price TP ≤ current price 
 z-value p-value z-value p-value z-value p-value 
 BBA and non-BBA 1.477 0.140 1.411 0.158 1.546 0.122 
Notes: Results of t-tests for differences in mean and median accuracy between BBA and non-BBA reports. BBA represents the sample of reports with a bull–bear 
analysis. Non-BBA represents the sample of reports with no bull–bear analysis. Panel A gives the sample distribution across the two groups and the mean and median 
accuracy for each group. Panel B gives the results of mean difference tests and panel C the results of median difference tests. TPError is the absolute value of the 




Table 7. Sample distribution and accuracy by recommendation level 
Panel A: Distribution of reports  














Buy 1,267 52.3 2,139 40.6 3,406 44.3 
Hold 810 33.5 2,164 41.1 2,974 38.7 
Sell 303 12.5 341 6.5 644 8.4 
Total 2,421  5,271  7,692  
Panel B: Mean TPError (%)   
 BBA Non-BBA Full sample 
Strong Buy 46.66 55.10 54.59 
Buy 56.15 61.30 59.39 
Hold 42.87 52.98 48.14 
Sell 40.57 48.71 44.88 
Panel C: TPError mean difference between non-BBA and BBA 
 t-stat 
1.105 









Notes: BBA represents the sample of reports with a bull–bear analysis. Non-BBA represents the sample 
of reports with no bull–bear analysis. Panel A gives the distribution of reports by recommendation 
level. Panel B reports accuracy in mean percentage for the two groups and the overall sample across the 
four recommendation levels. Panel C reports results for mean differences. TPError is the absolute value 
of the difference between the target price and the market price at the end of the forecast horizon divided 






Table 8. Pearson correlation matrix 
 TPError BBA BBAanalyst BBAcompany 
BBA −0.0555*    
BBAanalyst 0.0274 0.4754*   
BBAcompany −0.0656* 0.8697* 0.2700*  
Age −0.1320* 0.0653* 0.0292* 0.0881* 
Liq 0.1519* −0.1393* −0.0332* −0.1493* 
CVol −0.1074* 0.3220* 0.1779* 0.3834* 
EVol −0.0380* 0.2958* 0.1606* 0.3573* 
RVol 0.3654* −0.1157* −0.0227* −0.1431* 
Cov −0.1024* 0.1993* 0.0813* 0.2747* 
ln Cap −0.2505* 0.3494* 0.1508* 0.4185* 
TPDisp 0.4179* −0.0801* −0.0164 −0.0905* 
Bold 0.5127* −0.0348* 0.0157 −0.0445* 
Star −0.0410* −0.0223* 0.1142* −0.0350* 
InstOwn −0.0681* −0.0632* 0.0124 −0.0753* 
Affltd −0.0203 0.1993* 0.1824* 0.1653* 
Exp −0.0938* 0.2844* 0.2990* 0.2265* 
StrongBuy 0.0078 −0.1682* −0.2628* −0.1222* 
Hold −0.0898* −0.0725* 0.0476* −0.0796* 
Sell −0.0554* 0.1014* 0.0573* 0.0859* 
ROA −0.1414* 0.0351* −0.0185 0.0652* 
NegROA 0.1807* −0.0462* −0.0636* −0.0660* 
M/B 0.0106 0.0555* 0.0213* 0.0742* 
NegM/B 0.0122 0.0110 −0.0064 0.0250* 
Lev 0.0595* 0.0910* 0.0888* 0.1013* 
CrdtUp −0.0403* 0.0344* 0.0213* 0.0380* 
CrdtDown −0.0526* −0.0054 −0.0166 −0.0083 
LrgRevFreq 0.0310* 0.0714* 0.0719* 0.0619* 
EPSDev 0.1653* 0.1100* 0.0878* 0.1035* 
TPDev 0.0430* 0.1178* 0.0600* 0.1442* 
Momentum  −0.2895* 0.1000* −0.0646* 0.0978* 









 Age Liq CVol EVol RVol Cov ln Cap 
Liq −0.1224*       
CVol 0.3726* −0.1248*      
EVol 0.3492* −0.0851* 0.8842*     
RVol −0.1977* 0.5341* −0.1792* −0.0985*    
Cov 0.2284* −0.1049* 0.5428* 0.5261* −0.1715*   
ln Cap 0.3735* −0.2990* 0.8327* 0.7471* −0.3903* 0.5836*  
TPDisp −0.0914* 0.3442* −0.0733* 0.0206* 0.3780* −0.0518* −0.3268* 








Table 9. Propensity-score estimation using logistic regression 
 1 2  
 Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
Age −0.284*** 0.000 −0.124 0.189 
Liq −0.986*** 0.001 −0.15 0.692 
CVol 0.05 0.576 0.018 0.881 
EVol −0.058 0.465 0.059 0.584 
RVol 2.19 0.282 −0.815 0.693 
Cov 0.065 0.645 0.082 0.663 
ln Cap 0.392*** 0.000 0.16 0.118 
TPDisp −0.447* 0.075 0.329 0.230 
Bold 0.750*** 0.000 0.178 0.383 
Star −0.891*** 0.000 −1.666*** 0.000 
InstOwn 0.09 0.735 −0.622 0.114 
Affltd 0.608*** 0.000 −0.347* 0.097 
Exp 0.128*** 0.000 −0.034 0.198 
StrongBuy −1.826*** 0.000 −0.837*** 0.000 
Hold −0.081 0.485 0.038 0.810 
Sell 1.247*** 0.000 −0.041 0.881 
ROA 0.004 0.752 −0.012 0.433 
NegROA 0.246 0.199 0.14 0.614 
M/B 0.013 0.325 −0.039** 0.012 
NegM/B 0.333 0.387 0.669 0.241 
Lev 0.007 0.122 0.005 0.359 
CrdtUp 0.162 0.504 0.371 0.182 
CrdtDown −0.249 0.242 −0.215 0.524 
LrgRevFreq 0.059 0.567 0.259* 0.067 
EPSDev 0.319*** 0.000 0.170* 0.085 
TPDev 0.003 0.650 0.021*** 0.006 
Momentum  0.304*** 0.006 0.282* 0.064 
Horizon  −0.544*** 0.000 −0.325*** 0.000 
Morgan    6.664*** 0.000 
Constant −3.149* 0.090 −2.315 0.293 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Analyst report obs. 7,692 7,692 
Pseudo R
2
 28.9% 68.29% 
Wald  χ2 721.62 0.000 1240.34 0.000 
Notes: Logistic regressions of BBA on the variables determining analyst choice to supplement target prices with a 
BBA. The regressions include all proxies for information uncertainty, variables affecting target price accuracy, and 
control variables. The output of this regression, the probability of including a BBA in a report, is used to calculate 











Table 10. Covariate balance between matched pairs 
Panel A: Covariate balance between matched pairs  
 Mean t-test  
Bias reduction % Variable Treated Control t       p  > t Bias % 
Age      2.733 2.719 0.49 0.623 1.5 89.40 
Liq 0.188 0.190 −0.50 0.619 −1.3 95.90 
CVol 5.524 5.598 −1.51 0.130 −4.6 93.70 
EVol 5.339 5.407 −1.45 0.146 −4.3 93.60 
RVol 0.060 0.060 0.37 0.708 1.1 95.80 
Cov 2.510 2.523 −0.83 0.404 −2.4 94.70 
ln Cap 22.573 22.622 −0.98 0.326 −3.0 96.30 
TPDisp 0.218 0.222 −0.60 0.551 −1.5 91.40 
Bold 0.250 0.243 0.32 0.750 0.7 92.30 
Star 0.080 0.100 −2.33 0.020 −7.2 −47.20 
InstOwn 0.766 0.769 −0.60 0.547 −1.7 87.70 
Affltd 0.207 0.206 0.12 0.906 0.4 99.00 
Exp 5.529 5.367 1.55 0.122 4.8 92.40 
StrongBuy 0.018 0.021 −0.68 0.497 −1.1 97.30 
Hold 0.337 0.329 0.54 0.591 1.6 90.10 
Sell 0.126 0.135 −0.92 0.358 −3.1 84.80 
ROA 7.156 7.091 0.35 0.724 1.1 86.00 
NegROA 0.134 0.146 −1.19 0.233 −3.5 65.80 
M/B 4.205 4.004 1.41 0.160 4.2 63.30 
NegM/B 0.021 0.023 −0.46 0.642 −1.4 38.70 
Lev 25.261 24.497 1.19 0.233 3.5 82.10 
CrdtUp 0.060 0.085 −3.30 0.001 −11.6 −61.10 
CrdtDown 0.047 0.047 −0.14 0.890 −0.4 64.40 
LrgRevFreq 0.479 0.494 −0.97 0.331 −2.9 81.10 
EPSDev 0.417 0.416 0.06 0.950 0.2 99.10 
TPDev 7.433 7.745 −1.04 0.297 −3.3 85.90 
Momentum  −0.141 −0.117 −1.85 0.065 −5.2 77.10 
Horizon  11.896 11.907 −0.57 0.568 −0.8 97.60 
Morgan  0.669 0.676 −0.50 0.618 −2.5 98.90 
Panel B: Overall covariance balance test 
Pseudo 2R  before matching  0.213    
Pseudo 2R  after matching 0.006    
  p-value   
LR 2χ  before matching   2041.63 0.000   
LR 2χ  after matching   37.27 0.113   
Notes: Results of three balancing property tests for matching using propensity scores estimated excluding 
industry dummies. Panel A presents the balance test results for the matched pairs on all the covariates. Panel 





Table 11. Kernel propensity score matching: difference-in-differences estimation 
 Base Line  Follow Up  
DD 










A A – C 
        
TPERROR 0.613 0.490 −0.124 0.729 0.489 −0.240 −0.116 
Std. Error 0.027 0.020 0.034 0.027 0.009 0.028 0.044 
t-stat 22.81 −5.52 −3.68 4.92 −11.80 −4.21 −2.64 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.008*** 
Obs. 3277       
Notes: The (semi-parametric) matching difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of supplementing target prices with a BBA. The matching uses propensity 
scores estimated using all logit model variables of equation (5). Group A is the treatment group, the group of BBA reports. Groups B, C, and D are the control 
groups. Group B comprises reports by non-BBA analysts for companies for which BBA analysts include a BBA. Group C comprises reports by BBA analysts for 
companies for which BBA analysts do not include a BBA. Group D comprises reports by non-BBA analysts for companies for which BBA analysts do not include a 
BBA. Columns B − D and A − C report the difference in target price error between matched observations in the groups. Column DD reports the difference-in-
differences estimate. Groups are matched with replacement. Means and standard errors are estimated by linear regression.  





Table 12. Regression adjusted matching and conventional DD estimation of the effect of supporting 
valuations with a BBA on target price accuracy 
 1 2 
TPError       Coef.     p-value      Coef.     p-value 
BBAanalyst 0.063*** 0.000 0.063*** 0.000 
BBAcompany 0.038 0.105 0.038 0.104 
BBA −0.111*** 0.000 −0.113*** 0.000 
Age −0.006 0.455 −0.005 0.531 
Liq −0.376*** 0.000 −0.376*** 0.000 
CVol −0.012 0.204 −0.011 0.247 
EVol 0.027*** 0.002 0.028*** 0.002 
RVol 3.518*** 0.000 3.410*** 0.000 
Cov −0.012 0.410 −0.010 0.474 
ln Cap −0.018* 0.069 −0.021** 0.034 
TPDisp 0.211*** 0.000 0.207*** 0.000 
Bold 0.508*** 0.000 0.514*** 0.000 
Star −0.034** 0.050 −0.034** 0.049 
InstOwn −0.002 0.949 0.004 0.875 
Affltd −0.018 0.276 −0.016 0.313 
Exp −0.002 0.337 −0.002 0.356 
StrongBuy −0.042** 0.019 −0.044** 0.014 
Hold 0.003 0.786 0.002 0.900) 
Sell 0.076*** 0.003 0.078*** 0.002 
ROA −0.003** 0.049 −0.003** 0.046 
NegROA −0.024 0.255 −0.025 0.251 
M/B 0.004** 0.026 0.004** 0.016 
NegM/B −0.042 0.286 −0.032 0.401 
Lev 0.000 0.586 0.000 0.552 
CrdtUp −0.070*** 0.002 −0.073*** 0.002 
CrdtDown −0.086*** 0.004 −0.089*** 0.002 
LrgRevFreq 0.010 0.291 0.01 0.316 
EPSDev 0.053*** 0.000 0.048*** 0.000 
TPDev 0.001 0.447 0.000 0.748 
Momentum  0.004 0.843 0.006 0.764 
Horizon  −0.005 0.346 0.002 0.472 
Morgan 0.016 0.439 0.021 0.314 
Constant  0.502** 0.036 0.831*** 0.000 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  
Obs. 7517  7692  
Adjusted R-squared 39.6%  38.9%  
Notes: Results of (parametric) OLS regressions to estimate the difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of supplementing target 
prices with a BBA. The first column presents the results from regressing the accuracy measure TPError on the independent variable BBA 
and additional independent variables based on the matched sample. The matched sample matches observations from the treatment and 
control groups using propensity score matching. The second column presents the conventional DID estimation for the full sample. 
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering by analysts and companies to adjust for within cluster correlation. Table 3 provide variable 
definitions. 
 
